RETRACTED: Violation Punishment and Total Factor Productivity, Based on the Spillover Effect between Director-Interlocked Firms
Table 9
Property right heterogeneity test of violation punishment affecting total factor productivity of interlocked firms.
State = 1
State = 0
State = 1
State = 0
TFP_OPt+1
TFP_OPt+1
TFP_LPt+1
TFP_LPt+1
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.002
−0.058
0.001
−0.050
(0.09)
(−2.95)
(0.05)
(−2.63)
Age
−0.783
−0.931
0.211
0.193
(−23.49)
(−28.50)
(6.27)
(6.21)
Lev
0.475
0.839
0.549
0.863
(7.56)
(11.95)
(8.29)
(12.99)
Size
0.390
0.369
0.555
0.551
(42.60)
(30.03)
(60.33)
(44.39)
Grow
0.115
0.115
0.108
0.075
(4.09)
(3.61)
(3.86)
(2.45)
ROE
1.534
1.531
1.797
2.243
(11.87)
(9.81)
(12.98)
(14.93)
Independ
0.054
0.213
0.251
−0.064
(0.32)
(1.13)
(1.41)
(−0.34)
Dual
−0.019
−0.007
−0.031
0.007
(−0.69)
(−0.33)
(−1.10)
(0.34)
Constant
0.941
1.766
−2.225
−2.433
(3.56)
(5.03)
(−8.35)
(−8.49)
Ind/year
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adj_R2
0.651
0.555
0.738
0.735
F
143.849
66.178
247.138
146.136
N
3803
3399
3803
3399
Chi2
4.54
3.32
Note. ,, and indicate that the variables pass the test at the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are t values, which are all two tailed.
