Beyond PS-LTE: Security Model Design Framework for PPDR Operational Environment

Table 2

Studies on LTE protocol security.

	LTEInspector [5]	LTE layer 2 vul. [6]	LTEFuzz [7]
Analysis target protocol	NAS (attach, paging, detach)	MAC and PDCP	RRC and NAS
Approach	Model-based adversarial approach	Manual analysis	Semi-automatic fuzzing
Prerequisite	Adversarial model construction	[Fingerprinting attack] websites metadata acquisition	Building pack DB for fuzzing
	Security property definition	[aLTEr attack] deleting victim’s DNS and http cache	Targeting TMSI acquisition
Cons	Manually prepare the prerequisites	Proposing the results in experimental environment	No protocol interaction for fuzzing
		[Fingerprinting attack] low website coverage	Generated fuzzing message simply by packet field mutation
		[aLTEr attack] unrealistic prerequisite