A Resource-Friendly Authentication Protocol for UAV-Based Massive Crowd Management Systems

Table 1

Summary of related methods.

Protocol	Year	CMA	Properties/limitations
Turjman et al. [29]	2017	ECC and PR	Lacks resistance against replay attack.
Srinivas et al. [19]	2019	SKP	Lacks anonymity and resistance to impersonation based on stolen verifier.
Zhou et al. [21]	2019	ECC and PR	Insecure against IoT device forgery attack.
Wazid et al. [23]	2019	SKP	Weak against stolen verifier-based forgery of users, UAVs, and trusted control centers and lacks untraceability.
Zhang et al. [24]	2020	SKP	Lacks forward secrecy and is weak against insiders and stolen verifier attacks.
Bera et al.-I [25]	2020	ECC and BC	Weak against man-in-the-middle, replay, and impersonation attacks and lacks anonymity.
Bera et al.-II [26]	2020	ECC and BC	Lacks anonymity and the UAV does not verify signature authenticity of the ground station.
Kirsal [30]	2020	ECC and PR	Lacks perfect forward secrecy and is weak against known session key and insider attack.
Nikooghadam et al. [28]	2021	ECC	Lacks anonymity and is weak against stolen verifier attack and secret parameter exposure.
Proposed	—	ECC	Provides resistance to known attacks with comparable computation and communication costs.

Note. CMA: cryptographic method adopted; ECC: elliptic curve cryptography; PR: bilinear pairing; SKP: symmetric key primitives; BC: blockchain.