Differential Game and Simulation Study on Management Synergy of Regional Coal Mine Emergencies in China

Table 1

Parameters of differential game models of the central government, the local government, and coal mine enterprises.

Symbol of parameter	Description of parameter
T	Time
K	Diffusion coefficient
Γ	Amount of reduced loss per unit effort
C1	Cost coefficient of the local government for coal mine emergencies
C2	Emergency cost coefficient for coal mine enterprises in sudden disasters
Α	Benefit brought to the local government per unit reduced accident loss
Β	Benefits brought to coal mine enterprises per unit reduced accident loss
Η	Degree of rewards and punishments by the central government for the local ones
Μ	Degree of reward and punishments by the local government for the mine enterprises
εc	Degree of emergency supervision by the local government
ει	Degree of emergency supervision by the central government
	Emergency performance level coefficient of the central government
	Emergency performance level coefficient of the local government
Θ	Coefficient of unit loss caused by sudden coal mine accident to the local government
Π	Coefficient of unit loss caused by sudden coal mine accident to the coal mine enterprises