Strategic Interaction between Operators in the Context of Spectrum Sharing for 5G Networks

Table 1

Summary of notations.

		Eq.
General Model
Mean packet system time		(1)
Mean service rate		(1)
Subscribers mean arrival rate		(1)
Operator 1’s number of users		(1)
Operator 2’s number of users		(1)
Virtual Operator’s relative priority		(2)
Quality perceived by the users		(4)
Users sensitivity to delay		(4)
Conversion factor		(4)
Users utility		(5)
Price charged by operator		(5)
Operator i’s profits		(6)
Game Model
Operator 1’s best response		(11)
Operator 2’s best response		(12)
Operator 1’s equilibrium price		(13)
Operator 2’s equilibrium price		(14)
Operator 1’s equilibrium number of users		(16)
Operator 2’s equilibrium number of users		(16)
Arbitrarily small positive value
Boundary cases I-II		(34)
Boundary cases I-II		(35)
Boundary cases III-IV		(36)
Boundary cases II-IV		(37)
The Appendix- Monopoly
Monopolistic operator’s profits		(A.1)
Monopolistic operator’s number of users		(A.1)
Price charged by monopolistic operator		(A.1)
Users Utility		(A.3)
Monopolistic operator’s optimal price		(A.9)